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Abstract
We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players
have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and
the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically
over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined
jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejects the current proposal.
This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. These
special cases have in common that equilibria in pure stationary strategies exist, are efficient,
are characterized by the absence of delay, and converge to a unique limit corresponding
to an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. For our more general protocol, we show
that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such
equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria as the players become infinitely
patient need not be unique.
Keywords: Strategic Bargaining, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Stationary Strategies,
Nash Bargaining Solution.
JEL codes: C78.
1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) studies the division of a surplus among two im-
patient players through a non-cooperative bargaining game. Following this contribution,
a rich literature has emerged which extends and generalizes Rubinstein’s approach. In
this paper, we point out a number of general results which have persistently and recur-
rently emerged from this literature, and we explore the boundaries of their scope. More
in particular, we give some examples where a further generalization of the model leads
to a break-down of these results. While the analysis of unanimity bargaining games has
typically focussed on subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies, we show that
in a more general set–up such equilibria need not exist.
For the purpose of this paper, we mean by a unanimity bargaining game a non-
cooperative game with the following characteristics. There is a finite number of players
who need to make a unanimous choice for one particular payoff vector within a fixed set of
feasible payoffs. The game is set in discrete time. In each round of the game, one player is
the proposer. His role is to suggest one particular feasible payoff vector. The other players
then sequentially accept or reject this proposal in some fixed order. If all players agree
to the proposal, the game ends and the agreed payoffs are realized. As soon as one of
the players rejects the current proposal, the game proceeds to the next round. The time
horizon is infinite, so players may disagree forever, which yields a payoff of zero to every
player. The payoffs are subject to time-discounting. When an agreement is reached, the
payoff of each player is multiplied by an exogenously given discount factor for each round
which has previously passed without agreement.1
In order to complete the description of a unanimity bargaining game, one has to specify
a rule which determines who is the proposer in each round. We will refer to this rule as
the protocol in the sequel. Rubinstein (1982) studies a game with only two players who
simply take turns in making proposals, the alternating offer protocol. Rubinstein finds a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies happen to be stationary.
It is well-known that the uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium breaks down in una-
nimity bargaining games with more than two players. With regard to those games, the
literature focusses on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies, which allow sharp
1Instead of time-discounting, some authors assume an exogenous breakdown of the negotiation to
occur after each disagreement with probability 1−δ. Time-discounting and the possibility of an exogenous
breakdown are largely interchangeable interpretations of δ. The term “bargaining friction” can be used to
capture both of them. The importance of the bargaining friction lies in the fact that it creates an incentive
to come to an agreement sooner rather than later.
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predictions of the equilibrium payoffs at least when the discount factor is sufficiently close
to one. Arguably the most obvious generalization of Rubinstein’s alternating offer proto-
col to the case with more than two players is the rotating protocol, under which players
become proposers in ascending order, and player one proposes again after player n. One
alternative proper generalization of the alternating offers protocol is the rejector-proposes
protocol. Under that rule, the first player to reject the current proposal becomes the next
proposer. The rejector-proposes protocol is an example of an endogenous protocol in which
the actions taken by the players throughout the game have an influence on the proposer
selection. One important example of a protocol that is not a proper generalization of
Rubinstein’s alternating offers is the time-invariant probability protocol. That protocol
consists of an exogenously given probability distribution from which the proposer is drawn
in each round.
The literature on unanimity bargaining games has established some results that are
generally valid no matter which of these protocols is assumed.
1. Subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies exist and they are efficient.
2. Subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies predict immediate agreement
in every subgame.
3. In the limit as δ approaches one, all the proposals of all the stationary subgame
perfect equilibria converge to a unique limit proposal.
4. The limit proposal is equal to an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution.
The limit proposal itself depends on the distribution of bargaining power inherent in the
protocol. Kultti and Vartiainen (2010) show that the limit proposal is the Nash Bargaining
Solution under the rotating protocol. Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2008)
study the time-invariant probability protocol. In this case, the limit proposal corresponds
to the asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, where the vector of bargaining weights is
given by the time-invariant probability distribution. Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski
(2010) study a protocol where the proposer is chosen by a Markov process. That is, there
are n probability distributions on the n players. The identity of the proposer in the current
round determines which of the n probability distributions is used to draw the proposer in
the following round. The Markov process is assumed to have a stationary distribution.
Then, the limit proposal corresponds to an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution, where
the vector of bargaining weights is given by the stationary distribution of the Markov
process. This Markovian protocol is a generalization of the time-invariant probabilities
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and the rotating protocols – in fact, it seems to be the most general among the exogenous
protocols.
Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2012) complement that analysis with a study of
endogenous protocols. More in particular, they consider a protocol that consists of n
probability distributions on the n players and the identity of the player who rejects the
current proposal determines which one of those probability distributions will be used to
draw the following proposer. It turns out that the limit proposal depends only on the
probabilities with which each player becomes the proposer after his own rejection. More
in particular, the limit proposal is again an asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution where
the vector of bargaining weights is proportional to the vector of probabilities with which
the players propose after their own rejections.2 One implication of this result is that the
limit proposal corresponds to the Nash Bargaining Solution under the rejector-proposes
protocol.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start by formally describing a unanimity
bargaining game with a quite general protocol in Section 2. In particular, this protocol is
designed such that it includes all the aforementioned protocols as special cases. Section 3
summarizes the results in the existing literature regarding existence, efficiency, immediate
agreement, uniqueness, and characterization of equilibrium. Within the framework of that
model, we will give some examples to demonstrate that such results are not valid for more
general protocols. Section 4 presents an example where pure stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium predicts delay, inefficiency, and non-uniqueness of limit equilibrium. Section 5
shows the example to be robust. Herings and Predtetchinski (2009) have shown for the
protocol with time–invariant recognition probabilities that pure subgame perfect equilibria
in stationary strategies exist even when the set of feasible payoffs is non–convex. We
show in Section 6 that even when the set of feasible payoffs corresponds to the division of
a surplus, a pure subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies may not exist for
general protocols.
Our results complement some of the examples of equilibrium delay and non–existence
found in the literature. An example of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exhibit-
ing delay has been given in Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993) in the context of
coalitional bargaining. Unlike the unanimity bargaining games considered here, in coali-
tional bargaining games a proposing player may choose to make an offer to a subset of
the players. The approval of the proposal by all players in the chosen coalition is then
2This result requires, however, that these probabilities to propose after one’s own rejection are strictly
positive for all players.
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sufficient for the proposal to pass. Also in a coalitional bargaining context, Bloch (1996)
shows that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. Merlo
and Wilson (1995) show that delay in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is possible
if the size of the cake changes stochastically over time. Je´hiel and Moldovanu (1995) show
that delay can arise due to externalities. In addition to these examples where delay arises
in a complete and perfect information framework, there is a literature on bargaining delays
when the parties are asymmetrically informed, see e.g. the review in Ausubel, Cramton,
and Deneckere (2002).
2 Model
We consider a non–cooperative bargaining game G(N, V, S, ι, p0, p, δ), where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of players and V ⊂ Rn+ is the set of feasible payoff allocations. Bar-
gaining takes place in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . . In each round one player is selected as a
proposer, and proposes an element v of V. Next the players sequentially respond to the
proposal and in case of unanimous acceptance, the proposal is implemented and the game
ends with payoffs v to the players. As soon as one player rejects, the game breaks down
with probability 1 − δ, and continues to the next round with probability δ. In case of
breakdown, as well as in case of perpetual disagreement, payoffs to all players are equal to
zero.
Our emphasis will be on the role of the bargaining procedure in determining the bar-
gaining outcome. The set of feasible payoffs V is therefore kept fixed in each round, but
our bargaining procedure is allowed to be quite general. To achieve this, we make use of a
finite state space S. The function ι : S → N × Π, where Π is the set of permutations on
N, assigns to each state a proposer and an order of responders. That is, if ι(s) = (i, pi),
then Player i is the proposer in state s and all players sequentially respond to the proposal
in the order pi(1), . . . , pi(n) given by the permutation pi. In round t = 0, the initial state is
determined by the probability distribution p0 ∈ ∆(S), where ∆(S) is the set of probability
distributions on S. In any round t > 0, the state of the game is determined by transition
functions pj : S → ∆(S), one for each Player j ∈ N . If Player j ∈ N rejects the proposal
at time t when the game is in state s, then pj(s) returns the probability distribution from
which the state at time t+ 1 is drawn conditional on the continuation of the negotiations.
Many protocols that have been studied in the bargaining literature are special cases of
the class of protocols described above, up to relatively unimportant modeling details. Such
modeling details concern whether there is some probability of breakdown of negotiations, or
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whether players have time preferences. In case time preferences take the discounted utility
form, although conceptually different from the risk preferences that are needed to study
models with breakdown, both approaches lead to the same results as argued in Binmore,
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). Another issue is whether players vote simultaneously
or sequentially. Under simultaneous voting, the solution concept of subgame perfection
has less bite, and on top of subgame perfection it is typically required that players use
stage-undominated voting strategies to avoid coordination problems. We study sequential
voting in this paper.
The protocol studied in the seminal contribution of Rubinstein (1982) corresponds to
the case where S = N = {1, 2}, Player s is the proposer in state s, and state transitions are
such that the state alternates between periods. Player 1 is the initial proposer. Formally,
in Rubinstein (1982), Player s does not vote on his own proposal in state s, but allowing
for this option would not change the analysis. Kultti and Vartiainen (2010) consider a
multilateral extension of alternating offer bargaining, where proposer rotate in making
offers. Their model corresponds to the case where S = N, Player s is the proposer in state
s, and the state transition is to state s + 1 modulo n with probability 1 if the current
state is s. Banks and Duggan (2000) study legislative bargaining models and consider
time–invariant recognition probabilities in a framework incorporating unanimity rule as a
special case. Time–invariant recognition probabilities result when S = N and there is a
fixed probability distribution p0 on S such that the proposer is selected in accordance with
p0 in every time period. Kalandrakis (2004) and Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2010)
consider the case where S = N and require that for all j, k ∈ N, pj = pk. For s ∈ S, it holds
that ι(s) = (s, pi0), where pi0 is the identity. The state denotes the current proposer and
Player i responds before Player j if and only if i < j. State transitions are not influenced
by the identity of the rejecting player. Merlo and Wilson (1995) also assume that for all
j, k ∈ N, pj = pk, and even allow for an infinite state space S. They also allow the set of
feasible payoffs to depend on the state s, but since our attention here is on the influence
of the protocol on the allocation of the payoffs, we consider a fixed set V instead.
All the bargaining protocols described in the previous paragraph have in common that
the actions taken by the players are without consequence for the way the bargaining pro-
tocol proceeds in case of a rejection, i.e. for all j, k ∈ N it holds that pj = pk. We refer to
these protocols as exogenous.
The rejector-becomes-proposer protocol is introduced in Selten (1981) in a coalitional
bargaining set-up and specifies that the player who rejects the current proposal is automat-
ically called upon to make the next proposal. Kawamori (2008) generalizes this protocol
to allow for a general probabilistic selection of a new proposer, conditional on who rejects
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the current proposal. When we apply his coalitional bargaining model to our unanimity
bargaining set-up, we obtain the case where S = N, for s ∈ S it holds that ι(s) = (s, pi0),
where pi0 is some fixed permutation of the players, and for all s, s′ ∈ S, pj(s) = pj(s′).
Whenever for some j, k ∈ N, pj 6= pk, the actions of the players influence the way the
bargaining protocol proceeds, and we refer to such protocols as endogenous protocols. The
rejector-becomes-proposer protocol is a key example of an endogenous protocol.
3 Results in the Existing Literature
Multilateral bargaining games are known to admit a wide multiplicity of subgame perfect
equilibria, see Herrero (1985) and Haller (1986). It is therefore common in the literature to
restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Although ideally
the notion of stationarity should follow endogenously from the specification of the game
as in Maskin and Tirole (2001), the literature typically takes the more ad hoc approach
described below, which in general leads to weaker notions of stationary equilibrium than
the one of Maskin and Tirole (2001).
A stationary strategy for Player i in the game G(δ) specifies, for each state s ∈ S
such that ι(s) = (i, pi) for some pi ∈ Π, a proposal θs ∈ V, and for each state s ∈ S an
acceptance set Ai,s ⊂ V. A stationary strategy of a player specifies a unique action for
each of his decision nodes. This action depends only on the state and not on any other
aspect of the history if the player is a proposer and on the state as well as the proposal
made if the player is a responder. A stationary strategy profile (θ, A) leads to a unique
probability distribution over payoffs in V, so determines the utility ui(θ, A) of Player i ∈ N.
Conditional utilities are denoted by ui(θ, A | s). The social acceptance set in state s ∈ S
is defined as As = ∩i∈NAi,s. The social acceptance set consists of all alternatives that are
unanimously accepted when proposed in state s.
Definition 3.1 A subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is a profile
of stationary strategies which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
We make the following standard assumptions on V, where we use the notation V+ =
V ∩ Rn+ and ∂V+ is the set of weakly Pareto efficient points in V+. Moreover, a vector η
with ‖η‖ = 1 is said to be normal to the set V at a point v¯ ∈ V if (v − v¯)>η ≤ 0 for every
v ∈ V. The set of all vectors η normal to V at v¯ is called the normal to V at v¯.
Assumption A The set V is closed, convex, and comprehensive from below. The origin
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lies in the interior of V. The set V+ is bounded and all points in ∂V+ are strongly
Pareto efficient. There is a unique vector in the normal to V at every v ∈ ∂V+.
A stationary strategy profile (θ, A) is said to have no delay if for every s ∈ S it holds
that θs ∈ As. A stationary strategy profile (θ, A) is said to be efficient if for every s ∈ S it
holds that θs ∈ ∂V+.
Apart from the analysis of G(δ), the literature also typically studies the behavior of
equilibria when the continuation probability δ tends to 1.
Definition 3.2 The profile of proposals θ¯ = (θ¯s)s∈S is a limit equilibrium if there is a
sequence {δm}m∈N of continuation probabilities in [0, 1) converging to 1 and a sequence of
profiles {θ(δm)}m∈N = {(θs(δm)s∈S)}m∈N, where θ(δm) is an SSPE profile of proposals of
the game G(δm), such that limm→∞ θ(δm) = θ¯.
A limit equilibrium is a profile of proposals that can be approximated arbitrarily close
by an SSPE profile of proposals when the probability of breakdown is sufficiently small.
Of particular interest is the relationship between limit equilibria and the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution with positive weights µ ∈ Rn+ \ {0}, denoted µ-ANBS and defined as
follows.
Definition 3.3 The asymmetric Nash product with weights µ ∈ Rn+ \ {0} is the function
f : V+ → R defined by
f(v) =
∏
i∈N
(vi)
µi .
The µ-ANBS is the unique maximizer of the function f on the set V+.
Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2010) study the class of exogenous protocols char-
acterized by the following assumption.
Assumption B It holds that S = N, for every s ∈ S, ι(s) = (s, pi0) with pi0 the identity,
for all j, k ∈ N, pj = pk, and the matrix M = [pj(1), . . . , pj(n)] is irreducible.
An irreducible matrix M has a unique stationary distribution µ. Recall that a stationary
distribution µ is a probability distribution on the set of states satisfying Mµ = µ. The
class of protocols satisfying Assumption B is sufficiently rich to encompass alternating and
rotating offers and time–invariant recognition probabilities.
Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2012) study the class of endogenous protocols char-
acterized by the following assumption.
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Assumption C It holds that S = N × Π, for every s ∈ S, ι(s) = s, for every j ∈ N, for
all s, s′ ∈ S, pj(s) = pj(s′). There exists (j, pi) ∈ S such that pj(s) assigns positive
probability to (j, pi).
We associate to each protocol satisfying Assumption C the weights µ > 0 given by
µj =
∑
(j,pi)∈S p
j
(j,pi)(s), where the choice of s is irrelevant by Assumption C, so µj is the
probability that Player j becomes the next proposer conditional on a rejection by himself.
The class of protocols satisfying Assumption C is sufficiently rich to include the rejector-
becomes-proposer protocol as well as the generalization by Kawamori (2008).
The following result follows from Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2010, 2012).
Theorem 3.4 If Assumptions A and B, or Assumptions A and C, are satisfied then
1. An SSPE exists.
2. Every SSPE has no delay.
3. Every SSPE is efficient.
4. There is a unique limit equilibrium.
5. All limit equilibrium proposals are equal to the µ-ANBS.
The five claims in Theorem 3.4 can be thought of as increasingly demanding. The
characterization of limit equilibrium proposals as a weighted Nash bargaining solution has
been shown in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) for bilateral bargaining. For
multilateral bargaining this result is obtained in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for uniform
time–invariant recognition probabilities, in Miyakawa (2008) and Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008) for general time–invariant recognition probabilities, and in Kultti and Vartiainen
(2010) for rotating offers. Theorem 3.4 includes these results as special cases. The five
claims of Theorem 3.4 and in particular the limit equilibrium payoffs are independent of
the order in which the responding players accept or rejects the proposal. This is noteworthy
in the case of an endogenous protocol as in Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2012) – for
instance, one might have conjectured that the rejector–proposes protocol favors the player
who comes first in the responder order.
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4 Failure of No Delay, Efficiency, and Uniqueness
Ideally one would like to prove Theorem 3.4 for the entire class of bargaining protocols as
laid down in Section 2, up to standard regularity assumptions. In this section we present
an example where properties (2)–(5) of Theorem 3.4 are violated. Moreover, the example
is minimal in the sense that it has S = N = {1, 2, 3}, and for two states out of three we
have pj(s) = pk(s), for all j, k ∈ N. The protocol is therefore exogenous and Assumption
B is satisfied, with the exception of one state.
Example 4.1 There are three players and three states, S = N = {1, 2, 3}. Player i is the
proposer in state i, and players respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, pi0),
ι(2) = (2, pi0),
ι(3) = (3, pi0),
where pi0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one unit, V = {v ∈ R3|v1 +
v2 +v3 ≤ 1}. This set clearly satisfies Assumption A. In state s = 1, the transitions depend
on the identity of the player who rejects a proposal. If Player 1 rejects a proposal, each
player becomes the next proposer with equal probability. If Player 2 or Player 3 rejects a
proposal, this player becomes the next proposer with probability one. We have
p1(1) = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
p2(1) = (0, 1, 0),
p3(1) = (0, 0, 1).
In states s = 2, 3, the transitions are independent of the identity of the rejecting player.
Once in state 2, Player 2 remains the proposer forever. The same holds true in state 3.
We have
pi(2) = (0, 1, 0), i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (0, 0, 1), i ∈ N.

The next result claims not only that equilibria may exhibit delay, but even makes the
stronger statement that all SSPEs feature delay.
Proposition 4.2 For δ > 1/2, every SSPE in Example 4.1 has delay.
9
Proof. Suppose (θ, A) is an SSPE which has no delay. Consider a subgame starting
with a proposal by Player 2 in state 2. In this subgame, Player 2 remains the proposer
forever, and it is straightforward to verify that the subgame has a unique SSPE where
Player 2 captures the entire surplus. It holds that u(θ, A | 2) = (0, 1, 0). By a completely
symmetric argument, we find that u(θ, A | 3) = (0, 0, 1). Now consider a subgame starting
with a proposal by Player 1 in state 1. Since (θ, A) has no delay, Player 2 accepts θ1 and
it holds that θ12 ≥ δ, since a rejection by Player 2 leads to a breakdown with probability δ
and a transition to state 2 and a payoff of 1 for Player 2 with probability 1− δ. Similarly,
it holds that θ13 ≥ δ, since a rejection by Player 3 leads to a breakdown with probability δ
and a transition to state 3 and a payoff of 1 for Player 3 with probability 1− δ. It follows
that
θ11 ≤ 1− θ12 − θ13 ≤ 1− 2δ < 0.
Since Player 1 can ensure a non-negative payoff by a strategy that rejects all proposals, we
have obtained a contradiction to (θ, A) being an SSPE which has no delay. 
The intuition behind the example is the following. If Player 2 rejects the proposal of Player
1, then the game goes to an absorbing state where Player 2 remains the proposer forever.
It is well-known that in any SSPE of such a subgame Player 2 would capture the entire
surplus. Thus, when the game is in state 1 Player 2 can guarantee himself a payoff of δ by
rejecting Player 1’s proposal. In any SSPE with no delay, Player 1 would need to offer at
least the amount δ to Player 2. The same argument applies to Player 3: If Player 3 rejects
a proposal of Player 1, the game goes to an absorbing state where Player 3 remains the
proposer forever and can capture the entire surplus. Thus, when Player 3 reacts to the
proposal of Player 1, he will not accept any less than δ. Indeed, the sum of the responding
players’ reservation payoffs is equal to 2δ. We can see that if δ > 1
2
, then the available
surplus is not sufficient for Player 1 to pay the other two players their reservation payoffs.
Consequently, if δ > 1
2
, no agreement can be reached in state 1.
In the example, states 2 and 3 are absorbing. However, small changes in all transition
probabilities do not affect the main argument, and would still lead to the conclusion that for
a sufficiently high value of the continuation probability δ, all SSPEs have delay. Section 5
studies the case where transition probabilities are perturbed in more detail.
The next issue is whether there is an SSPE with delay in Example 4.1. Consider
a strategy profile (θ¯, A¯) with proposals θ¯1 ∈ V , θ¯2 = (0, 1, 0), and θ¯3 = (0, 0, 1), and
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acceptance sets
A¯1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
A¯2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ δ, v3 ≥ δ},
A¯2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ δ},
A¯2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ 0},
A¯3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ δ}, s = 1, 3,
A¯3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ 0}.
When players play according to (θ¯, A¯), Player 1 makes a particular proposal belonging
to V in state 1, which will be rejected by some player when δ > 1/2. More precisely, the
proposal θ¯1 in state 1 is rejected by Player 1 when θ¯11 < 0 and is rejected by Player 2
otherwise. Notice that in state 1, Player 2 would even reject the counterfactual proposal
(0, 1, 0), since acceptance of such a proposal would lead to a rejection by Player 3, followed
by breakdown of the negotiations or a transition to state 3.
If θ¯11 < 0, after the rejection by Player 1, negotiations break down with probability
1−δ and continue with probability δ. If negotiations continue, transitions occur with equal
probability to each of the three states, a rejection of proposal θ¯1 by Player 1 in state 1, an
acceptance of payoff vector (0, 1, 0) in state 2, and an acceptance of payoff vector (0, 0, 1)
in state 3.
If θ¯11 ≥ 0, after the rejection by Player 2, negotiations break down with probability 1−δ
and continue in state 2 with probability δ. In the latter case, the payoff vector (0, 1, 0) is
proposed and accepted.
Proposition 4.3 For δ > 1/2, the strategy profile (θ¯, A¯) is an SSPE in Example 4.1.
Proof. To show that (θ¯, A¯) is an SSPE, it suffices to verify the one-shot deviation
property, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). We consider three cases, depending
on the state to which a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
After a history in state 1 where Player 1 has to propose, the proposal θ¯1 is rejected, either
by Player 1 in case θ¯11 < 0 or by Player 2 in case θ¯
1
1 ≥ 0, and leads ultimately to breakdown,
or the acceptance of proposal θ¯2, or the acceptance of proposal θ¯3. In all cases, Player 1
receives a payoff of zero. A one-shot deviation to any other proposal is rejected as well,
either by Player 1 or by Player 2, and also leads ultimately to a payoff of zero for sure.
Such a deviation is therefore not profitable.
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After a history in state 1 where Player 1 has to respond, any proposal v with v1 < 0
is rejected by Player 1, and ultimately leads to a payoff of zero for sure. A one-shot
deviation to acceptance leads to the acceptance of v and a negative payoff for Player 1,
or the rejection of v by Player 2 or Player 3 and a payoff of zero for Player 1. Such a
deviation is therefore not profitable. Any proposal v with v1 ≥ 0 is accepted by Player 1,
next rejected by Player 2, and followed by breakdown of the negotiations or acceptance of
(0, 1, 0) in the next period. The payoff for Player 1 is therefore zero. A one-shot deviation
to rejection leads ultimately to a payoff of zero for Player 1 as well and is therefore not
profitable.
After a history in state 1 where Player 2 has to respond, any proposal v with v2 < δ
or v3 < δ is rejected by Player 2, which results in a payoff of δ for Player 2. A one-shot
deviation to acceptance is followed by an acceptance by Player 3 if v3 ≥ δ and leads to
payoff v2 < δ for Player 2, so is not profitable, and is followed by a rejection by Player 3
if v3 < δ, leading to payoff 0 for Player 2, so is not profitable either. Any proposal v with
v2 ≥ δ and v3 ≥ δ is accepted by Player 2, followed by an acceptance by Player 3, and
a payoff of v2 for Player 2. A one-shot deviation to rejection leads to a payoff of δ for
Player 2 and is therefore not profitable.
After a history in state 1 where Player 3 has to respond, any proposal v with v3 < δ is
rejected by Player 3, resulting in a payoff of δ for Player 3. A one-shot deviation to accep-
tance is clearly not profitable. Any proposal v with v3 ≥ δ is accepted by Player 3, leading
to a payoff of v3 for Player 3. A one-shot deviation to rejection is clearly not profitable.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
After a history in state 2 where Player 2 has to propose, the proposal θ¯2 = (0, 1, 0) by
Player 2 is accepted by all players, and leads to utility 1 for Player 2. Since Players 1
and 3 reject proposals which give them a negative payoff, there are no profitable one-shot
deviations for Player 2. Since a one-shot rejection by any player leads to payoffs (0, δ, 0),
the one-shot deviation property holds for responders.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
This case is similar to Case 2. 
Proposition 4.3 describes a continuum of SSPEs, parametrized by the proposal θ¯1 by
Player 1. For equilibria with θ¯11 < 0, the equilibrium payoffs when starting in state 1
are equal to u(θ¯, A¯ | 1) = (0, δ/(3− δ), δ/(3− δ)). For equilibria with θ¯11 ≥ 0, it holds that
u(θ¯, A¯ | 1) = (0, δ, 0). None of the properties, apart from SSPE existence, mentioned in
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Theorem 3.4 are satisfied. All SSPEs have delay. There is a continuum of SSPEs where
Player 1 makes an inefficient proposal, and even if Player 1 makes an efficient proposal, it
is still rejected by Player 1 or Player 2. Any element of V × {(0, 1, 0)} × {(0, 0, 1)} can be
a limit equilibrium, so there is no unique limit equilibrium. When starting in state 1, limit
equilibrium utilities are either equal to (0, 1/2, 1/2) or (0, 0, 1). Finally, limit equilibrium
proposals are not equal to each other.
5 Robustness of the Example
In this section, we examine the robustness of Example 4.1 to perturbations of the transition
probabilities. In particular, we will see that the presence of absorbing states is not vital
for equilibrium delay.
Indeed, one may object to Example 4.1 that states 2 and 3 are absorbing, no matter
what actions the players take, and therefore an analogue of the irreducibility requirement
of Assumption B as made for exogenous protocols is not satisfied. The requirement for
endogenous protocols of Assumption C, there is a player such that after his rejection he is
the next proposer with positive probability, is satisfied. Moreover, the proof of Properties 2
and 3 of Theorem 3.4 does not make use of the irreducibility assumption or the positive
probability to make a counterproposal. Such regularity assumptions are only needed for
the proof of Properties 4 and 5 of Theorem 3.4.
Still, we would like to argue that Example 4.1 is robust to perturbations in the transition
probabilities and that the violations of Properties 2-5 of Theorem 3.4 are not due to the
presence of absorbing states. Consider the case where all the transition probabilities are
perturbed by some ε ∈ (0, 1/3). We obtain the following example.
Example 5.1 There are three players and three states, S = N = {1, 2, 3}. Each player is
the proposer in one state and players respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, pi0),
ι(2) = (2, pi0),
ι(3) = (3, pi0),
where pi0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one unit, V = {v ∈ R3|v1 +
v2 + v3 ≤ 1}. We perturb the transitions of Example 4.1 by ε ∈ (0, 1/3). In state s = 1,
the transitions depend on the identity of the player who rejects a proposal,
p1(1) = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
),
p2(1) = (ε, 1− 2ε, ε),
p3(1) = (ε, ε, 1− 2ε).
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In states s = 2, 3, the transitions are independent of the identity of the rejecting player,
pi(2) = (ε, 1− 2ε, ε), i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (ε, ε, 1− 2ε), i ∈ N.

Consider a strategy profile (θˆ, Aˆ) with proposals
θˆ1 ∈ {v ∈ V | v1 < 0},
θˆ2 = (0, 1− y, y),
θˆ3 = (0, y, 1− y),
where
y =
3δε
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) ,
and acceptance sets
Aˆ1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
Aˆ2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z, v3 ≥ z},
Aˆ2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z},
Aˆ2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ y},
Aˆ3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ z}, s = 1, 3,
Aˆ3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ y},
where
z =
δ(1− δ)(3− δ − 9δε2) + δε(2− δ)(6δ − 3)
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) .
When players play according to (θˆ, Aˆ), Player 1 makes a proposal θˆ1 in V with θˆ11 < 0 in
state 1, which is rejected by Player 1 himself, and a transition to each of the three states
follows with equal probability. In state 2, Player 2 makes a proposal that gives a payoff of
0 to Player 1, gives the reservation payoff y to Player 3, and keeps the remainder of the
surplus himself. State 3 is symmetric to state 2, with the roles of Players 2 and 3 reversed.
The proposals θˆ2 and θˆ3 in states 2 and 3 are accepted since 1− y > z, which follows from
the fact that
(3− δ)(1− δ) + 3δε(2− δ) > δ(1− δ)(3− δ − 9δε) + δε(2− δ)(6δ − 3).
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Proposition 5.2 For every ε ∈ (0, 1/6), there exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every δ ≥ δ¯ the
strategy profile (θˆ, Aˆ) is an SSPE in Example 5.1.
Proof. For s = 1, 2, 3, we define the equilibrium utilities conditional on state s, xs =
u(θˆ, Aˆ | s). The symmetry of the game and the strategies implies that x12 = x13, x21 = x31,
x22 = x
3
3, and x
2
3 = x
3
2. It holds that x
1 = (0, δ/(3 − δ), δ/(3 − δ)), x2 = θˆ2, and x3 = θˆ3,
where the expression for x1 uses the observation that x12 = (δ/3) + (δ/3)x
1
2.
To show that (θˆ, Aˆ) is an SSPE, we verify the one-shot deviation property. We consider
three cases, depending on the state to which a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 3 has to respond. A rejection followed by
play according to (θˆ, Aˆ) leads to a payoff for Player 3 equal to δεx13 + δεx
2
3 + δ(1− 2ε)x33.
A straightforward, but tedious, calculation reveals that this payoff is equal to z. Since
Player 3 accepts proposals in state 1 if and only if v3 ≥ z, this shows that the one-shot
deviation property is satisfied.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 2 has to respond to a proposal v.
Suppose first that v3 ≥ z. A calculation similar to that in the previous paragraph shows
that rejection of v by Player 2 yields a payoff of z. Acceptance of v by Player 2 leads to
the payoff v2 since v is also accepted by Player 3. We conclude that accepting the proposal
v if and only if v2 ≥ z does not violate the one-shot deviation principle.
Suppose now that v3 < z. As before, rejecting v yields Player 2 a payoff of z. If
Player 2 accepts v, it is rejected by Player 3, yielding a continuation utility equal to
δεx12 + δεx
2
2 + δ(1− 2ε)x32. A straightforward, though tedious, calculation reveals the latter
expression to be equal to y, and it holds that y < z since
z − y = (1− δ)(1− 3ε)(3− δ + 3δε)
(3− δ)(1− δ + 3δε) > 0.
Hence v should be rejected by Player 2.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1 is trivial for histories
where he responds. Consider a history where Player 1 proposes. Player 1 has a profitable
one-shot deviation if and only if he can make a proposal that gives more than z to Players 2
and 3 and a positive payoff to himself. We show that 2z ≥ 1, which implies the absence of
such deviations. A straightforward calculation shows that 2z ≥ 1 if and only if
(1− δ)(−3 + 7δ − 2δ2 − 21δε+ 12δ2ε− 18δ2ε2) ≥ 0. (1)
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The second term in the product on the left-hand side of (1), evaluated at δ = 1, is equal
to 2 − 9ε − 18ε2, which is positive for ε ∈ (0, 1/6). It follows that for every ε ∈ (0, 1/6),
there exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every δ ≥ δ¯, 2z ≥ 1.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
Player 3 accepts a proposal v if and only if v3 ≥ y, where y equals the continuation payoff
of Player 3 following his rejection. This shows that the one-shot deviation property is
satisfied.
Player 2 accepts a proposal v if and only if v2 ≥ z, where z equals the continuation
payoff of Player 2 following his rejection. We observe that acceptance of v yields Player 2
payoff v2 if Player 3 accepts as well, and z if Player 3 rejects v. This shows that the one-shot
deviation property is satisfied.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1 is trivial.
Consider a history in state 2 after which Player 2 proposes. Since the proposal θˆ2
of Player 2 gives Players 1 and 3 the least amount they are willing to accept, there is
no profitable one-shot deviation for Player 2 which will be accepted by Players 1 and 3.
Consider a one-shot deviation by Player 2 which is rejected by some player. Ultimately,
such a proposal leads to breakdown and payoff 0 for Player 2, or an acceptance of θˆ2 and
payoff 1− y for Player 2 or an acceptance of θˆ3 and Payoff y for Player 2. Since y < 1− y,
the expected payoff for Player 2 is less than x22 = 1− y, so the deviation is not profitable.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
By symmetry, the line of argument is the same as in Case 2. 
Proposition 5.3 presents an equilibrium which violates Properties 2 and 3 of Theorem 3.4. It
also has the remarkable feature that Player 1’s equilibrium payoff is equal to zero in every
state. This is surprising, since in the framework of Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski
(2012), the bargaining power of a player is proportional to the probability to propose
conditional on his own rejection. In the protocol of Example 5.1, this probability is at
least ε for Player 1, irrespective of the state and irrespective of the identity of the rejecting
player.
Consider a strategy profile (θ˜, A˜) with proposals
θ˜1 ∈ {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0},
θ˜2 = (0, 1− y3, y3),
θˆ3 = (0, y2, 1− y2),
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where
y2 =
δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 ,
y3 =
δε
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 ,
and acceptance sets
A˜1,s = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 0}, s = 1, 2, 3,
A˜2,1 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z2, v3 ≥ z3},
A˜2,2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ z2},
A˜2,3 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ y2},
A˜3,s = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ z3}, s = 1, 3,
A˜3,2 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ y3},
where
z2 =
δ − δ2 − 2δε+ 4δ2ε− 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 ,
z3 =
δ − δ2 − 2δε+ 3δ2ε
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 .
When players play according to (θ˜, A˜), Player 1 makes a proposal θ˜1 in V with θ˜11 ≥ 0 in
state 1. A straightforward calculation shows that z2 + z3 > 1 if and only if
(1− δ)(2δ − 6δε− 1) > 0.
Therefore it holds that if ε < 1/6 and δ > 1/(2 − 6ε), then Player 2 rejects θ˜1, and a
transition to state 2 follows with high probability. In state 2, Player 2 makes a proposal
that gives a payoff of 0 to Player 1, gives the reservation payoff y2 to Player 3, and keeps
the remainder of the surplus himself. State 3 is similar, with the roles of Players 2 and 3
reversed. The proposals θ˜2 and θ˜3 in states 2 and 3 are accepted since 1 − y3 ≥ z2 and
1− y2 ≥ z3 which follows respectively from
1− δ + δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 > δ(1− δ) + 2δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 > δ − δ2 − 2δε+ 4δ2ε− 3δ2ε2,
1− δ + δε > δ − δ2 − 2δε+ 3δ2ε.
Proposition 5.3 For every ε ∈ (0, 1/6), there exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every δ ≥ δ¯ the
strategy profile (θ˜, A˜) is an SSPE in Example 5.1.
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Proof. For s = 1, 2, 3, we define the equilibrium utilities conditional on state s, xs =
u(θ˜, A˜ | s). We have that x2 = θ˜2, x3 = θ˜3, x11 = 0, x12 = δεx12 + δ(1− 2ε)x22 + δεx32, so
x12 =
δ − δ2 − 2δε+ 4δ2ε− 3δ2ε2
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 ,
and x13 = x
2
3, since a rejection by Player 2 in state 1 leads to the same transitions as a
rejection by Player 3 in state 2.
To show that (θ˜, A˜) is an SSPE, we verify the one-shot deviation property. We consider
three cases, depending on the state to which a decision node belongs.
Case 1. Decision nodes in state 1.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 3 has to respond. A rejection followed by
play according to (θ˜, A˜) leads to a payoff for Player 3 equal to δεx13+δεx
2
3+δ(1−2ε)x33 = z3.
Since Player 3 accepts proposals in state 1 if and only if v3 ≥ z3, this shows that the one-
shot deviation property is satisfied.
Consider a history in state 1 after which Player 2 has to respond to a proposal v.
Suppose first that v3 ≥ z3. A calculation similar to that in the previous paragraph shows
that rejection of v by Player 2 yields Player 2 a payoff of z2. Acceptance yields v2 because
v is accepted by Player 3. Hence accepting v if and only if v2 ≥ z2 does not violate the
one–shot deviation principle.
Suppose now that v3 < z3. As before, rejecting v by Player 2 gives payoff z2. If Player
2 accepts v, then it is rejected by Player 3 and yields the continuation payoff of y2. It holds
that y2 < z2 since
z2 − y2 = δ(1− δ)(1− 3ε)
1− δ + 2δε+ δ2ε− 3δ2ε2 > 0.
Thus rejecting v does not violate the one–shot deviation principle.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1 is trivial for histories
where he responds. We have already argued that z2 + z3 > 1 if δ > 1/(2 − 6ε). For such
values of δ, Player 1 cannot make a profitable one-shot deviation as a proposer.
Case 2. Decision nodes in state 2.
Player 3 accepts a proposal v if and only if v3 ≥ y3, where y3 equals the continuation
payoff of Player 3 following his rejection. This shows that the one-shot deviation property
is satisfied.
Player 2 accepts a proposal v if and only if v2 ≥ z2, where z2 equals the continuation
payoff of Player 2 following his rejection. We observe that acceptance of v yields Player 2
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payoff v2 if Player 3 accepts as well, and z2 if Player 3 rejects v. This shows that the
one-shot deviation property is satisfied.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1 is trivial.
Consider a history in state 2 after which Player 2 proposes. Since the proposal θ˜2
of Player 2 gives Players 1 and 3 the least amount they are willing to accept, there is
no profitable one-shot deviation for Player 2 which will be accepted by Players 1 and 3.
Consider a one-shot deviation by Player 2 which is rejected by some player. Ultimately,
such a proposal leads to breakdown and payoff 0 for Player 2, or an acceptance of θ˜2 and
payoff 1 − y3 for Player 2 or an acceptance of θ˜3 and Payoff y2 for Player 2. Since it is
easily verified that y2 < 1 − y3, the expected payoff for Player 2 is less than x22 = 1 − y3,
so the deviation is not profitable.
Case 3. Decision nodes in state 3.
Player 3 accepts a proposal v if and only if v3 ≥ z3, where z3 equals the continuation
payoff of Player 3 following his rejection. This shows that the one-shot deviation property
is satisfied.
Player 2 accepts a proposal v if and only if v2 ≥ y2, where y2 equals the continuation
payoff of Player 2 following his rejection. We observe that acceptance of v yields Player 2
payoff v2 if Player 3 accepts as well, and y2 if Player 3 rejects v. This shows that the
one-shot deviation property is satisfied.
The verification of the one-shot deviation property for Player 1 is trivial.
Consider a history in state 3 after which Player 3 proposes. Since the proposal θ˜3 of
Player 3 gives Players 1 and 2 the least amount they are willing to accept, there is no
profitable one-shot deviation for Player 3 which will be accepted by Players 1 and 2. Con-
sider a one-shot deviation by Player 3 which is rejected by some player. Ultimately, such
a proposal leads to breakdown and payoff 0 for Player 3, or an acceptance of θ˜2 and payoff
y3 for Player 3 or an acceptance of θ˜
3 and Payoff 1 − y2 for Player 3. Since y3 < 1 − y2,
the expected payoff for Player 3 is less than x33 = 1−y2, so the deviation is not profitable. 
Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 give us a plethora of limit equilibria. From Proposition 5.2 we
can see that any point (θ1, θ2, θ3) where θ11 < 0 and θ
2 = θ3 = (0, 1
2
, 1
2
) is a limit equilibrium.
Similarly, Proposition 5.3 yields limit equilibria of the form (θ1, θ2, θ3) with θ11 > 0 and
θ2 = θ3 =
(
0,
2− 3ε
3− 3ε,
1
3− 3ε
)
.
Clearly not all players make the same proposals in the limit. The fact that in both
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cases Players 2 and 3 do make the same proposals in the limit can also be deduced from
Theorem 3.4. Indeed, since Player 1’s proposal is rejected, one can eliminate state 1 and
Player 1, and view the resulting system as an exogenous protocol involving Players 2 and
3 only.
6 Non-existence of SSPEs
In the example of the previous section, all properties of Theorem 3.4 are violated, with the
exception of the existence of an SSPE. In this section, we will present an example where
no SSPE exists at all, neither one with immediate agreement, nor one with delay.
Example 6.1 There are three players and three states, S = N = {1, 2, 3}. Each player is
the proposer in one state and players respond in ascending order, so we have
ι(1) = (1, pi0),
ι(2) = (2, pi0),
ι(3) = (3, pi0),
where pi0 is the identity. Players have to divide a surplus of one unit, V = {v ∈ R3 |
v1 + v2 + v3 ≤ 1}. In state s = 1, the transitions depend on the identity of the player who
rejects a proposal,
p1(1) =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)
,
p2(1) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
, 0
)
,
p3(1) =
(
1
2
, 0, 1
2
)
.
In states s = 2, 3, the transitions are independent of the identity of the rejecting player,
pi(2) = (0, 1, 0) , i ∈ N,
pi(3) = (0, 0, 1) , i ∈ N.
The continuation probability δ is equal to 3/4. 
The only modification in Example 6.1 when compared to Example 4.1 is the possibility
to return to state 1 with probability 1/2 after a rejection by either Player 2 or Player 3.
Proposition 6.2 There is no SSPE in Example 6.1.
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Proof. Suppose (θ, A) is SSPE. It clearly holds that θ2 = (0, 1, 0) and θ3 = (0, 0, 1).
Now let x = u(θ, A | 1) be the vector of expected payoffs in a subgame starting in state 1,
and zi be the vector of continuation payoffs after a proposal in state 1 is rejected by Player
i. We have
z1 = δ
3
x+ δ
3
(0, 1, 0) + δ
3
(0, 0, 1) = 1
4
x+ (0, 1
4
, 1
4
),
z2 = δ
2
x+ δ
2
(0, 1, 0) = 3
8
x+ (0, 3
8
, 0).
z3 = δ
2
x+ δ
2
(0, 0, 1) = 3
8
x+ (0, 0, 3
8
).
We distinguish four possible cases.
Case (A) The proposal θ1 is accepted by Players 1, 2, and 3.
In this case x = θ1. Since all players accept θ1, we have
x1 ≥ z11 = 14x1,
x2 ≥ z22 = 38x2 + 38 ,
x3 ≥ z33 = 38x3 + 38 .
This gives the inequalities x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 35 , and x3 ≥ 35 , whereas at the same time x1 +x2 +
x3 = θ1 + θ2 + θ3 ≤ 1, a contradiction.
Case (B) The proposal θ1 is accepted by Players 1 and 2, and rejected by Player 3.
Since Player 3 rejects θ1, we have
x = z3 = 3
8
x+ (0, 0, 3
8
),
so x = z3 = (0, 0, 3
5
). Since Player 2 accepts θ1, we have
z32 ≥ z22 = 38x2 + 38 ,
contradicting that z32 = x2 = 0.
Case (C) The proposal θ1 is accepted by Player 1 and rejected by Player 2.
Since only proposals offering zero payoff to Player 1 are accepted, it holds that z11 = 0.
Since Player 2 rejects θ1, we have
x = z2 = 3
8
x+ (0, 3
8
, 0)
so x = z2 = (0, 3
5
, 0). Therefore,
z3 = 3
8
x+ (0, 0, 3
8
) = (0, 9
40
, 3
8
).
21
Suppose Player 1 makes the proposal
v = ( 1
120
, 3
5
+ 1
120
, 3
8
+ 1
120
).
Since v3 > z
3
3 the proposal v is accepted by Player 3. Since v2 > z
2
2 it is accepted by
Player 2 also. And since v1 > z
1
1 = 0 the proposal v is accepted by Player 1. But then
proposing v is a profitable one–shot deviation for Player 1.
Case (D) The proposal θ1 is rejected by Player 1.
If Player 1 rejects his own proposal, then x = z1, so x = (0, 1
3
, 1
3
). It now follows by exactly
the same argument as in Case (C) that Player 1 has a profitable one-shot deviation. 
Perturbing the transition functions slightly will not affect the conclusion of the propo-
sition. When we parametrize games by the transition functions, one can show that the set
of games having an SSPE is closed.
7 Conclusion
We consider bargaining games of perfect information with a unanimous acceptance rule.
The focus of the analysis is on the selection of the proposer. In the model considered,
the proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by the state. The
probability distribution over states in the following period is determined jointly by the
current state and the identity of the player who rejected the previous proposal.
Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2010, 2012) study two extreme special cases of this
framework: one where the identity of the future proposer only depends on the identity of
the current proposer, and one where it only depends on the identity of the rejector. In both
cases it is shown that subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies exist, are
efficient, and have the immediate acceptance property. Asymptotically, as players become
perfectly patient, all such equilibria converge to the appropriately defined asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution.
In this paper, however, we show that these conclusions do not carry over to the gen-
eral framework: subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist.
When they do exist, such equilibria may exhibit delay and may be inefficient. The limit
equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
One message in Britz, Herings, and Predtetchinski (2012) is that the bargaining power
of a player is determined by the probability to propose conditional on that player’s rejection.
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One of our examples shows that even though players can propose with positive probability
conditional on their rejection in every state, they might still have no bargaining power at
all.
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